Contests between groups of workers are often used to create incentives in organizations. Managers can sort workers into groups in various ways in order to maximize total output. We explore how the optimal sorting of workers by ability in such environments depends on the degree of effort complementarity within groups. For moderately steep costs of effort, we find that the optimal sorting is balanced (i.e., minimizing the variance in ability between groups) when complementarity is weak, and unbalanced (i.e., maximizing the variance in ability) when complementarity is strong. However, when the cost of effort is sufficiently steep, the optimal sorting can be unbalanced for all levels of complementarity or even alternate between unbalanced and balanced as the level of complementarity increases.
Introduction

1
In this paper, we are interested in the following question: When an organization uses an incentive scheme involving a group contest, how should it sort workers of heterogeneous abilities into groups in order to maximize the total output of all the participating groups? Consider, for example, an architectural firm employing multiple designers, business developers, and construction administrators, all with varying abilities. If the firm has several ongoing projects, each of which requires one of each type of employee, the firm will form teams and may use a contest to incentivize high effort. In order to maximize total output (measured, for example, as a combination of quality, cost effectiveness, timeliness of project completion and client satisfaction), should the firm put the best designer, developer, and administrator together in the same team, or create a balance of highly skilled and less skilled employees in each team?
2
The principal result of this paper is in showing that the answer to this question depends, sometimes in nontrivial and counter-intuitive ways, on the level of complementarity between the efforts of the team members in the production process, as well as on the shape of the workers' effort cost function. For illustration, suppose there are four workers enumerated 1 through 4 in the descending order of ability, and assume that the production process involves groups of two workers. In a group contest with balanced sorting, group (1,4) would compete with group (2,3); whereas, in the case of unbalanced sorting group (1,2) would compete with group (3,4). Consider first the extreme case when within-group efforts are perfect substitutes. Because of free-riding, competition between the groups will be determined primarily by the effort of the best worker in each group.
3 Thus, the balanced contest will effectively reduce to a contest between workers 1 and 2, whereas the unbalanced contest will be a contest between workers 1 and 3. Given that the average ability is higher in the former contest, it appears that the balanced sorting should be preferred by the management in this case. In the opposite extreme case of perfect complementarity of efforts within groups, the equilibrium effort will be determined by a contest between the lowest ability workers in each group, i.e., between workers 3 and 4 in the case of balanced sorting and workers between workers 2 and 4 in the case of unbalanced sorting. Here, the average ability is higher in the latter contest; therefore, it appears that the unbalanced sorting should be preferred by the management. Group production processes are characterized by different levels of complementarity between workers. For example, an airport security checkpoint operates in a manner close to perfect complementarity, while waiters in a restaurant or facilitators at a children's summer camp are close to perfect substitutes. Given the different effects of sorting on aggregate contest output in the two extreme cases discussed in the previous paragraph, there must be a cut-off level of complementarity at which the optimal sorting of workers in a group contest switches from balanced to unbalanced.
We model a group contest with complementarities using a lottery (Tullock, 1980 ) group contest success function (CSF) with a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregation of within-group efforts and workers with heterogeneous convex costs of effort. We consider the combined output of all groups in equilibrium as a function of the level of within-group effort complementarity. Surprisingly, we find that the way in which complementarity interacts with optimal sorting is more complex than the simple intuition above suggests, and depends on the shape of the workers' cost function of effort. For example, for certain parameters, there are intermediate levels of complementarity, such as a Cobb-Douglas aggregation function, where balanced sorting is optimal, even though unbalanced sorting is optimal at either extreme. In order to explore the effect of sorting on output, similar to Ryvkin (2011), we use the quadratic approximation to the true equilibrium efforts and develop an expansion of output in the moments of the distribution of abilities. Within the quadratic approximation, we describe all possible cases for how optimal sorting depends on within-group effort complementarity, and provide an example of each case.
The problem of optimal sorting of heterogeneous players in a group contest with perfect substitutes has been explored by Ryvkin (2011) , who showed that the optimal sorting is balanced as long as the players' effort function is not too steep. Being an important benchmark case, the perfect substitutes technology is not the most realistic in applications. Indeed, within-group complementarities, or synergies, are one of the key reasons group production exists in the first place (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972) . In this paper we extend the analysis of Ryvkin (2011) to arbitrary levels of within-group complementarity.
The theoretical literature on group contests goes back to Katz, Nitzan and Rosenberg (1990) and Nitzan (1991) who first considered symmetric group contests with a lottery CSF, perfectly substitutable within-group effort, and linear effort costs. In a similar setting, Baik (2008) considers the case of heterogeneous prize valuations and shows that only the highest-valuation player in each group exerts positive effort in equilibrium. Other within-group aggregation functions have also been analyzed. Lee (2012) considers the weak-link (perfect complements) technology, while Chowdhury, Lee and Sheremeta (2013) study the "best-shot" technology in which a group's output is determined by the maximal effort. The same aggregation functions have also been analyzed in an alternative perfectly discriminating contest (all-pay auction) setting in which the group producing the highest output wins with certainty (e.g., Baik, Kim and Na, 2001; Topolyan, 2014; Chowdhury, Lee and Topolyan, 2013; Barbieri, Malueg and Topolyan, 2013) . A group contest involving groups with different aggregation technologies (one weak-link and the other -best-shot) is analyzed by Chowdhury and Topolyan (2013) . Finally, Kolmar and Rommeswinkel (2013) use the CES aggregation function and allow for different complementarity levels in different groups and within-group player heterogeneity with linear effort costs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate the general model and prove the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. In Section 3, we use the quadratic approximation to calculate the equilibrium output and analyze the problem of optimal sorting. In Section 4, we provide numerical illustrations of the various possible scenarios, identified in Section 3, of how optimal sorting may change with the level of complementarity and the shape of effort cost functions. Section 5 provides a discussion and concluding remarks.
The model
Consider a contest between n groups, indexed by i = 1, . . . , n, of m risk-neutral players each. The players in group i are indexed by ij = i1, . . . , im. All players in all groups simultaneously and independently choose effort levels e ij ≥ 0. The cost of effort e ij to player ij is c ij g(e ij ), where c ij > 0 is the player's cost parameter and g is a strictly increasing function. Parameters c ij (i = 1, . . . , n; j = 1, . . . , m) are common knowledge.
The output of group i is given by the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggre-
) 1/ρ , with ρ ≤ 1. The probability of group i winning the contest is
If group i wins the contest, each of its players i1, . . . , im receives a prize normalized to one; otherwise, all players receive zero, which is also all players' outside option payoff.
The expected payoff of player ij is, thus, equal to
Let c min = min i,j c ij and c max = max i,j c ij denote, respectively, the lowest and highest cost parameters among all players. Since each player can guarantee herself a payoff of zero by choosing zero effort, the region of efforts (e max , ∞), with c min g(e max ) = 1, is strictly dominated for all players. Thus, e max is an upper bound on effort levels that can be chosen in equilibrium. We assume that a finite e max exists and impose the following assumptions on function g(·) on the interval [0, e max ].
Assumption 1 (i) g(·)
is continuously differentiable on [0, e max ] and thrice continuously
(iv) c max
Assumptions 1(i)-(iii) are standard. Assumptions 1(iv)-(v) ensure, as formulated in Proposition 1 below, that a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies with all players exerting positive efforts exists. To this end, for ρ = 1, Assumption 1(v) requires that the marginal cost of effort at zero effort be zero and the cost of effort be strictly convex. When ρ < 1, the strict convexity of g(·) and zero marginal costs at zero are no longer necessary, but marginal costs at zero should not be too large, with an upper bound provided by Assumption 1(iv).
Pure strategy equilibrium effort levels e * ij satisfy the system of Kuhn-Tucker conditions for maximization of π ij with respect to e ij :
Equations (2) hold with equality for e * ij > 0. It is easy to see that the left-hand side of (2) is decreasing in e ij ; therefore, π ij is a concave function of e ij and the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are necessary and sufficient for maximization. The following proposition establishes the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium.
Proposition 1 In the contest game defined above, with Assumptions 1(i)-(v) satisfied,
there exists a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium in which all players' efforts e * ij > 0 solve the system of first-order conditions (2) with equality.
All proofs are provided in the Appendix. Proposition 1 is a generalization of a similar proposition in Ryvkin (2011) for ρ = 1. The proof relies on a reduction of the group contest to an effective contest among n individuals and then uses the result of Cornes and Hartley (2005) .
The effects of sorting on output
Assume that there is a principal whose objective is maximization of total equilibrium output in the contest,
In this paper, we focus on the effects of sorting of players into groups by their ability. Thus, we assume that the contest structure and the set of nm players with cost parameters (c ij ) i=1,...,n;j=1,...,m are fixed, and the only manipulation available to the principal is the assignment of players to the groups. Different such assignments, or sortings, may potentially lead to different levels of equilibrium output E, and the goal of this section is to identify the optimal sorting. The system of first-order conditions (2) has no closed-form solution, except for some special cases (such as, for example, for cost functions g(e) = e t with t > 1). Even in those cases when a closed-form solution exists, equilibrium output E is a complicated function of cost parameters c ij , which is not helpful in the identification of optimal sortings. For any given parameterization, one can potentially find the optimal sorting by going through all possible sortings. This approach is not constructive, however, because, first, it becomes very inefficient as n and/or m grow (the number of possible sortings is ( nm n ) ), and, second, it does not provide any general insights into the properties of optimal sortings.
In this section, we use an alternative approach that addresses both issues raised above. It is computationally efficient and provides a clear-cut criterion of optimality for sortings. Importantly, the results do not rely on the availability of a closed-form solution for equilibrium efforts. Such universality comes at a cost: the solution is obtained approximately, in the form of a second-order expansion of aggregate output in the sample moments of the distribution of cost parameters c ij . The approximation relies on the weak heterogeneity assumption for cost parameters, i.e., on the assumption that parameters c ij are not very different, in relative terms, from some average valuec. As we show with numerical illustrations, the approximation has a very high accuracy for small to moderate levels of heterogeneity.
Without loss of generality, introduce the average cost parameterc = (nm)
−1 ∑ i,j c ij and define relative abilities (or simply abilities) a ij by writing c ij =c(1 − a ij ). By construction, a ij < 1 and ∑ i,j a ij = 0. A player with a higher (lower) a ij has a lower (higher) cost of effort; moreover, a player with a ij > 0 (a ij < 0) has the cost parameter below (above) the average levelc. Let S 2 a = (nm)
ij denote the sample variance of abilities. The weak heterogeneity assumption we make states that S a ≪ 1, i.e., the spread in relative abilities is small compared to unity.
Letē denote the equilibrium effort in the symmetric contest of nm players with c ij =c for all i, j. It is given by the solution to the equation
which exists and is unique under Assumption 1(iv). In the contest with heterogeneous players, we will write equilibrium efforts in the form e * ij =ē(1 + x ij ), where x ij is the relative effort of player ij as compared to the symmetric equilibrium level. Provided the equilibrium described by Proposition 1 exists and is sufficiently smooth in parameters, we expect that under the weak heterogeneity assumption relative efforts x ij will be small compared to unity, in the same sense as relative abilities a ij are small. Thus, we will look for relative efforts x ij in the form of a Taylor expansion in the powers of a ij . Due to the symmetry of the contest, this will lead to a representation of aggregate output E in the form of an expansion in the moments of a ij . We restrict the expansion by the second order, which, as we show, is the lowest order in which the effects of sorting on output can be seen.
denote the sample variance in ability across groups. The aggregate output in a contest of homogeneous players isĒ = nm 1/ρē . Similar to individual effort, we will write the aggregate output for heterogeneous players in the form E =Ē(1 + Y ), where Y is small compared to unity under the weak heterogeneity assumption. In the quadratic approximation, we present Y in the form (1) = 0, i.e., there is no first-order effect of sorting on aggregate output. This result is standard and is due to the symmetric structure of the contest and the mean-preserving nature of sorting. At the same time, Y (2) ̸ = 0, i.e., the main effect of sorting is given by the second-order correction to aggregate output. Due to the symmetric structure of the contest, the second-order correction has a particular symmetric form described in Proposition 2 below. It is convenient to introduce the following dimensionless coefficients:
Coefficients k 2 and k 3 represent, respectively, the second-and third-order dimensionless curvatures of the cost function g(·) at the symmetric equilibrium point. Coefficient k 2 can be interpreted as the elasticity of the marginal cost of effort, and k 3 as the elasticity of the second derivative of effort costs. Also, let ξ = 1 − ρ denote the level of complementarity of effort within groups, with ξ ≥ 0, and ξ = 0 corresponding to perfectly substitutable effort.
Proposition 2 (a) In the contest defined above, in the quadratic approximation, the aggregate equilibrium output is
A , and
(b) The optimal sorting of players into groups minimizes (maximizes) the variation in ability across groups, in the quadratic approximation, if
Part (a) of Proposition 2 shows that the second-order correction to aggregate output is a linear combination of the sample variance in ability across all nm players, S 2 a , and the sample variance in ability across groups, S 2 A . While S 2 a is fixed for a given set of players, S 2 A can be manipulated through sorting of players into groups. Specifically, S 2 A is minimized (maximized) by the most balanced (unbalanced) sorting that makes aggregate abilities across groups as equal (unequal) as possible. As stated in part (b) of the proposition, the effect of such manipulations depends on the sign of coefficient Λ ξ .
Note that for ξ = 0 (i.e., for ρ = 1 when within-group efforts are perfect substitutes), we have κ = −k 3 , γ = −1, and the expressions for λ a and λ A in (6) simplify to those in Ryvkin (2011), with
For cost functions of effort that are not too steep, i.e., k 2 ≥ k 3 , we have Λ 0 < 0 and hence λ A < 0 and the optimal sorting is balanced. For very steep effort cost functions such that Λ 0 > 0, we have λ A > 0 and the optimal sorting is unbalanced.
4
Consider now the opposite limit of a large ξ (i.e., a large negative ρ when within-group efforts are strong complements). The following lemma describes the asymptotic behavior of coefficient Λ ξ in this case.
Lemma 1
Lemma 1 Cases (a) and (b) are the most straightforward extensions of the results of Ryvkin (2011) for perfect substitutes to arbitrary levels of complementarity. In case (a), the optimal sorting is balanced for perfect substitutes, and Λ ξ has a single crossing pointξ. In this case, the optimal sorting continues to be balanced as long as ξ <ξ and becomes unbalanced for ξ >ξ. In case (b), the optimal sorting is unbalanced for perfect substitutes and remains unbalanced for all ξ as Λ ξ is always positive. It should be noted that case (b) is somewhat less intuitive than case (a) and only arises for very steep effort cost functions g (·) .
Cases (c) and (d) represent even less intuitive departures from case (a). In (c), the unbalanced sorting is optimal for low and high levels of complementarity, but the balanced sorting is optimal for intermediate levels of complementarity. In (d), the unbalanced sorting is optimal for perfect substitutes but balanced sorting becomes optimal beyond a crossing pointξ and continues to be optimal as ξ increases.
To get some intuition behind the behavior of Λ ξ in cases (c) and (d), it helps to consider the extreme case of perfect complements with ξ → ∞. In this case, equilibrium efforts in the group contest are determined by the lowest ability players in each group and the equilibrium output is proportional to the aggregate effort in the individual contest of these n players (Lee, 2012). For illustration, suppose there are two groups of two players, and the four players are ordered by their ability from 1 (highest ability) to 4 (lowest ability). The balanced sorting would match players (1,4) against players (2,3), while the unbalanced sorting would match players (1,2) against players (3,4). Thus, with perfectly complementary efforts, equilibrium for the unbalanced sorting would correspond to a contest between players 2 and 4, while for the balanced sorting it would be a contest between players 3 and 4. Comparing the two contests, the effort of the underdog (player 4) is lower while the effort of the favorite (player 2 as compared to player 3) is higher in the former contest than in the latter.
5 The overall effect of sorting on the aggregate effort, therefore, depends on which of the two effects dominates. When the effort cost function is not too steep, the increase in the favorite's effort is larger than the reduction in the underdog's effort, hence the unbalanced sorting is optimal. However, when the effort cost function is very steep, the effect is reversed because it is prohibitively expensive for the favorite, whose effort is higher, to increase effort by a lot. For such very steep cost functions we have Λ ∞ < 0 and hence 2k 2 < k 3 , which implies Λ 0 > 0, i.e., the unbalanced sorting is optimal for perfect substitutes (case (d)). Case (c) arises as an intermediate step between (b) and (d). The effort cost function is sufficiently steep for the unbalanced sorting to be optimal for perfect substitutes (Λ 0 > 0), but it is not sufficiently steep to reverse the effect for perfect complements (Λ ∞ > 0). Consider again the contest involving players 1 through 4 from the paragraph above. When ξ = 0, marginal effort costs within groups are equalized and free-riding is the strongest. Because the cost function of effort is very steep, the equilibrium can be approximated by that of a contest between n highest-ability individuals in each group, i.e., between players 1 and 2 for the balanced sorting and players 1 and 3 for the unbalanced sorting. Similar to the discussion in the previous paragraph, player 1's effort is higher and the underdog's effort is lower in the latter contest; therefore, the overall effect is ambiguous. The fact that the unbalanced sorting dominates for ξ = 0 implies the increase in player 1's effort is larger than the reduction in the underdog's effort. For intermediate levels of complementarity, as ξ increases, equilibrium efforts of players within a group become closer to each other and are determined by a mixture of the cost parameters of the lowand high-ability players in the group. Somewhere along the way, Λ ξ may decrease below zero and the balanced sorting may become optimal for a range of ξ where it is beneficial to have more balanced average abilities. Note that a similar reduction in Λ ξ may occur in case (b) but it is not strong enough to reach zero.
In the following section, we present numerical examples of the four cases identified in Proposition 3.
Examples
For all examples in this section, we consider contests between n = 3 groups of m = 2 players each. The players' relative abilities are τ 1 = 5d/6, τ 2 = d/2, τ 3 = d/6, τ 4 = −d/6, τ 5 = −d/2 and τ 6 = −5d/6, where d is the heterogeneity parameter. For the weak heterogeneity approximation to apply, parameter d is supposed to be "small" compared to unity. In the examples below, we consider the values of d up to 0.5 and show that the quadratic approximation for aggregate output works very well for d at least as high as 0.3, which corresponds to about 50% spread in abilities across players. The balanced sorting of players into groups corresponds to the assignments of abilities a 11 = τ 1 , a 12 = τ 6 , a 21 = τ 2 , a 22 = τ 5 , a 31 = τ 3 and a 32 = τ 4 , while the unbalanced sorting of players corresponds to the assignment a 11 = τ 1 , a 12 = τ 2 , a 21 = τ 3 , a 22 = τ 4 , a 31 = τ 5 and a 32 = τ 6 . The examples differ by the shape of the effort cost function g(·).
Example 1 g(e) = e t , with t > 1. One of the simplest examples is that of a power function, which gives rise to case (i) in Proposition 3. Equation (6) gives
i.e., Λ 0 < 0 and Λ ξ increases linearly in ξ. There is a unique cutoff point,
such that Λ ξ < 0 (> 0) for ξ <ξ (ξ >ξ). For such effort cost functions, the optimal sorting is always balanced in the case of perfect substitutes (ξ = 0), and becomes unbalanced as the level of complementarity increases. A straightforward calculation shows that the cutoffξ, Eq. (9), decreases in t. For illustrations, we use the power function with t = 1.2 andc = 1. Equation (4) for the symmetric equilibrium effort level givesē = 0.138, which implies k 2 = 0.2 and k 3 = −0.8. The left and middle panels in Figure 1 show the second-order relative correction to aggregate output, Y (2) , as a function of heterogeneity parameter d, for, respectively, ξ = 0 (perfect substitutes) and ξ = 2. The solid and dashed curves show the quadratic approximation computed using Proposition 2; the squares show the results of high-precision numerical solutions. The solid curves correspond to the balanced sorting, while the dashed curves to unbalanced sorting. As predicted, the balanced sorting produces a higher aggregate output than the unbalanced sorting for perfect substitutes, but the reverse is true for the complementarity level ξ = 2, which is higher than the threshold valueξ = 1.136 (cf. Eq. (9)). The right panel in Figure 1 shows Λ ξ as a function of ξ. It starts at Λ 0 = −10 and increases monotonically towards Λ ∞ = 1.76 with a single root. Figure 2 show Y (2) as a function of d for, respectively, ξ = 0 and ξ = 2. As predicted, the unbalanced sorting produces a higher aggregate output than the balanced sorting in both cases. The right panel in Figure 2 shows Λ ξ as a function of ξ. Interestingly, although Λ ξ is positive for all ξ ≥ 0, it is nonmonotonic. As shown in the following example, such a nonmonotonicity may lead to Λ ξ becoming negative in an interval of intermediate complementarity levels.
Example 3 g(e)
This example produces case (iii) of Proposition 3, with Λ ξ alternating between positive and negative values as ξ increases. Solving Eq. (4), we obtainē = 0.798, k 2 = 2.757, k 3 = 5.271, Λ 0 = 9.968 and Λ ∞ = 13.707. The lower right panel in Figure 3 shows Λ ξ as a function of ξ. It is nonmonotonic and crosses zero atξ 1 = 1.102 andξ 2 = 5.014. The remaining three panels show Y (2) as a function of d for the balanced and unbalanced sortings for ξ = 0 (upper left), ξ = 2 (upper right) and ξ = 6 (lower left). As predicted, the unbalanced sorting produces a higher output for ξ = 0 and ξ = 6, which are both outside the interval [ξ 1 ,ξ 2 ]. For ξ = 2, which is inside the interval, the balanced sorting leads to a higher output. Figure 4 show Y (2) as a function of d for, respectively, ξ = 0 and ξ = 2. As predicted, the unbalanced sorting produces a higher aggregate output than the balanced sorting for ξ = 0, and the reverse is true for ξ = 2. The right panel in Figure 2 shows Λ ξ as a function of ξ.
Discussion and conclusions
A group contest is a natural way for a manager to increase productivity in organizations that use team production, particularly when effort is difficult to monitor but the final products of the teams are easy to compare. Giving a bonus to the best-performing team will incentivize workers to give more effort than what is required to simply keep their job, but exactly how much more effort they give depends, among other factors, on how the manager chooses to sort workers into teams. In this paper, we focus on the question of how a manager should sort a set of workers with heterogeneous abilities into teams in order to maximize the combined output of the teams in an organization using team contests. Unlike previous work on this subject, we allow for synergies among the members of each team, so that individual efforts combine with some degree of complementarity to produce team output. The primary result of our paper is Proposition 2 which provides a criterion for how a manager should sort her employees into teams to maximize output. We show that aggregate output can be manipulated by sorting through the sample variance of aggregate ability across groups. We find that a manager should either seek to minimize or maximize this variance, i.e., create balanced or unbalanced groups, depending on the sign of a criterion Λ ξ that depends on the degree of effort complementarity in team production and the properties of the workers' effort cost function.
Our results, therefore, have a direct managerial application to sorting in team contests. One could imagine certain production processes, such as airline security teams, where the success of the team depends critically on the effort given by each member of the group. Individual efforts complement each other and free-riding is not a viable option in such a situation. In other production processes, such as tomato picking on a farm or working a cash register in a supermarket, effort is much more substitutable. Interestingly, the precise extent to which the efforts complement each other can change the optimal sorting in non-trivial ways depending on the shape of the workers' effort cost function. When the costs of effort are not too steep, we find that balanced groups are optimal with less complementarity, but a cutoff level of complementarity exists beyond which unbalanced groups become optimal. Thus, for example, if a supermarket organizes a contest between shifts of cashiers, the optimal sorting of cashiers into shifts is balanced; at the same time, if an architectural firm uses a contest between teams working on similar projects, the optimal sorting of workers into the teams is unbalanced. While these may, to an extent, be considered expected results, the situation becomes much less intuitive when the costs of effort are very steep. We find that in this case unbalanced groups may be optimal for all levels of complementarity. It is also possible that unbalanced groups are optimal for low and high complementarity levels, while balanced groups are optimal for intermediate complementarity levels. Finally, it may be that unbalanced groups are optimal for low complementarity and balanced groups for high complementarity, with a single cutoff. We provide numerical examples of cost functions and parameterizations to illustrate each of these cases.
Admittedly, effort cost functions are not directly observable in the field, and serve merely as a building block of a model of decision making by employees. So, what does a more or less steep effort cost function actually represent? One interpretation is that the steepness of an effort cost function represents how easy it is for the worker to increase effort, if necessary. In the numerical examples, we observe that the counter-intuitive behavior of Λ ξ takes place for cost functions that have a threshold value of effort such that the marginal cost of effort can become infinite. It is close to such threshold effort levels that higher-order derivatives of effort costs increase faster than lower-order derivatives, which is a necessary condition for a reversal in the behavior of Λ ξ . In applications, this corresponds to workers choosing effort close to their natural effort capacity. For example, a medical resident or an associate at a law firm working 80 hours a week, or an airline pilot, or a truck driver may be operating very close to their effort capacity. In these industries, it is very costly, if not impossible, for workers to increase their effort; therefore, their cost of effort may be considered very steep.
We calculate the aggregate equilibrium output in the group contest in the form of an expansion in the sample moments of the distribution of abilities. By cutting the expansion at the second order, we thus find the quadratic approximation to the equilibrium output. There are several advantages to using this approach. First, it allows us to evaluate equilibrium output for a wide class of models, including those for which a closed-form characterization of equilibrium is not available. Second, it provides a representation for aggregate output in the form which is naturally amenable to solving the optimal sorting problem. Indeed, the second-order moment expansion contains a term proportional to the sample variance in abilities across groups, which the manager can manipulate by making groups more or less balanced in terms of their aggregate ability.
An obvious drawback of the quadratic approximation approach is that the results it provides are imprecise, and their accuracy relies on the weak heterogeneity assumption. However, our numerical examples show that the quadratic approximation works remarkably well, as compared to the precise numerical solutions, for a range of heterogeneity up to at least 50% variation in abilities across employees. In practice, the weak heterogeneity assumption means that employees' abilities are not too different from the firm's average. This assumption is justified in most situations because of the natural labor market sorting of employees that takes place between firms. Any given firm simply would not hire an employee whose ability is far below the firm's average, and any given employee would be unlikely to join a firm if her ability is far above the firm's average. For example, a topnotch law firm in New York City would only hire the best law school graduates from top universities, while a law firm in a small town would hire graduates from a state or local law school. A similar stratification of talent across universities takes place in academia.
Our results show that understanding the theory of group contests is perhaps a deeper and more complex problem than it was previously believed to be. This paper represents a framework upon which both further theoretical studies and new empirical studies of group contests can be undertaken. An astute manager may suspect that certain behavioral phenomena interact with the purely monetary incentives of workers to compete in a group contest. The predictions of this paper can be used as a benchmark against which to compare data from actual group contests, in order to better understand how a manager can optimally assign her workers into teams. and economic organization." American Economic Review, 62(5): 777-795.
Lazear, Edward P., and Sherwin Rosen. 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Opti-Suppose now that in some other group i ̸ = k all players choose zero effort and thereby guarantee themselves zero payoff. The payoff of player ij from a deviation to e ij > 0 is, in that case,
which has the derivative with respect to e ij at e ij = 0 equal to
Here, the first inequality follows by replacing the effort levels of all players in groups k ̸ = i by the upper bound e max and replacing c ij with the upper bound c max . The second inequality follows from Assumption 1(iv). Thus, player ij's marginal payoff at zero effort is positive, hence she has an incentive to deviate to an infinitesimally small positive effort. We conclude that there must be at least one active player in each group in equilibrium. Suppose player il is active in group i and consider some other player ij ̸ = il. The left-hand side of inequality (2) is infinite at e ij = 0, i.e., player ij's best response has to be positive and thus all players' equilibrium efforts are positive. Given that all players are active, the system of first-order conditions (2) holds with equality in equilibrium. The system then implies that for any two players ij and il in group i we have c ij g ′ (e ij )e
il , i.e., each player's effort can be written as a function of the effort of player i1. Defining function h(e) = g ′ (e)e 1−ρ and the ratio of cost parameters r ij = c i1 /c ij , obtain in equilibrium,
Note that under our assumptions function h is strictly increasing; therefore, the inverse of h exists and is also strictly increasing, hence µ is strictly increasing in e i1 and µ(0, r ij ) = 0. The aggregate output of group i can, therefore, be written as a function of the effort of player i1:
Clearly, E i is strictly increasing in e i1 , and a strictly increasing inverse function can be defined, e i1 = ν(E i , c i ), with ν(0, c i ) = 0. Here, c i = (c i1 , . . . , c im ) is the vector of cost parameters of players in group i.
The system of nm equations (2) then can be reduced to a system of n equations for the unknowns E i , i = 1, . . . , n:
This system of first-order conditions is equivalent to the one arising in a lottery contest of n individuals choosing effort levels E i with heterogeneous marginal cost functions given by the right-hand side of (11). The existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in such contests has been established by Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (1997) and Cornes and Hartley (2005) for the case when the cost functions are convex. Thus, in order to complete the proof we need to show that the right-hand side of Eq. (11) is increasing in E i .
Since ν E i > 0, we only need to consider the derivative of the right-hand side of Eq. (11) with respect to ν.
Omitting the factor c i1 in the front and the arguments of ν for brevity, obtain the derivative in the form
The sign of this expression is determined by the sign of the term in the square brackets, which can be simplified as
Thus, it is sufficient to show that for any player ij, with j > 1, we have
Recall that h(µ ij ) = r ij h(ν), which gives
.
The left-hand side of (12) then becomes
From the definition
The term in the square brackets in Eq. (13) then becomes
Thus, the effective marginal cost functions in the system of Eqs. (11) are increasing in E i , and hence the cost functions are convex, which implies that the equilibrium exists and is unique.
B Proof of Proposition 2
We start off by obtaining the second-order Taylor expansion for aggregate equilibrium output E. Plugging the representation e * ij =ē(1 + x ij ) into Eq. (3),
Recall that in the symmetric equilibrium with homogeneous playersĒ =ēm 1/ρ n. It is convenient to introduce the notation
, where x (q) ij denotes the qth order correction in the approximation of equilibrium effort. Similar notation will be used for aggregate effort corrections X and X i . In the quadratic approximation, output E is
Note that we dropped the second-order corrections in x ij and X i because when squared they will turn into fourth-order terms. As seen from Eq. (14), in order to calculate the aggregate output in the quadratic approximation we only need to find the first-order individual and group effort corrections x obtain 1 m
kl .
Using the the notation X
i .
Summing up this equation over all players
Summing up (19) over all groups i = 1, . . . , n, obtain
Thus, the linear correction to aggregate effort is equal to zero. This result is standard and is due to the symmetric structure of the contest and the mean-preserving parameterization of heterogeneity.
Using the result X (1) = 0, obtain from Eq. (19)
Plugging this back into Eq. (18), obtain
Thus, the first-order correction to individual equilibrium effort is a linear combination of the player's own ability and the aggregate ability of her group. For ρ = 1, i.e., in the case of perfectly substitutable effort, we have β < 0, indicating free-riding. As ρ decreases, β becomes positive and free-riding is replaced by within-group coordination.
Next, we find X (2) . Equating the second-order terms in (16) and summing up over i and j, obtain
Using that X (1) = 0 and solving the equation above for X (2) , obtain
Plugging this into (14), obtain the expression for aggregate output, 
Recall that x Similarly, Eq. (20) gives
Combining these expressions and introducing the notation ξ = 1 − ρ, obtain
where
Introducing κ = α(ξ(1 − k 2 ) − k 2 k 3 ), immediately obtain the coefficient λ a on S 2 a in (24) as in (6). For Λ ξ , simplify further:
Using the definitions of α and β in (21), obtain Λ ξ = 2(k 2 + κ)((n − 1)k 2 + 1) + κ((n − 1)ξ − 1)
which gives the coefficient λ A on S 2 A in (6).
C Proof of Lemma 1
Transform Λ ξ as follows:
At first glance, the expression in square brackets is a cubic polynomial in ξ. However, the coefficient on ξ 3 in that polynomial is
(1 − k 2 )(n − 1) 2 + (k 2 − 1)(n − 1) 2 = 0, i.e., it is, in fact, a quadratic polynomial in ξ. Given that the denominator is also quadratic in ξ, the limit lim ξ→∞ Λ ξ is finite and determined by the coefficient on ξ 2 in the numerator.
That coefficient is Λ ∞ = 2((n − 1)k 2 + 1)(n − 1) − 2(1 − k 2 )(n − 1) − k 2 k 3 (n − 1) 2 + 2(k 2 − 1)(n − 1) 2 k 2 = (n − 1)[2(n − 1)k 2 + 2 − 2 + 2k 2 − k 2 k 3 (n − 1) + 2(k 2 − 1)k 2 (n − 1)] = (n − 1)k 2 [(n − 1)(2k 2 − k 3 ) + 2].
D Proof of Proposition 3
As shown in the proof of Lemma 1 above, the sign of Λ ξ is determined by the sign of a quadratic polynomial in ξ that may have zero, one or two roots on [0, ∞). Note that if Λ ∞ < 0, it necessarily implies that Λ 0 > 0. Thus, it is impossible to have both Λ ∞ < 0 and Λ 0 < 0. The other three cases (both Λ ∞ and Λ 0 are positive, Λ ∞ > 0 and Λ 0 < 0, or Λ ∞ < 0 and Λ 0 > 0) are possible. The case when both Λ ∞ and Λ 0 are positive has two sub-cases: case (b) in the proposition, in which Λ ξ is positive for all ξ, and case (c) in the proposition, in which Λ ξ is negative in some range [ξ 1 ,ξ 2 ]. The cases when Λ ∞ > 0, Λ 0 < 0 and Λ ∞ < 0, Λ 0 > 0 correspond to cases (a) and (d) in the proposition, in both of which there is exactly one pointξ where Λ ξ crosses zero.
